Abstract
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commissioned a study through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to investigate both the background and personality characteristics of those individuals who proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The DIA is hopeful that some particular background traits will stand out and allow them advanced warning that the potential for proliferation exists in a suspect. This study will be limited to three individuals: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan who specializes in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, General Anatoly Kuntsevich who specializes in the proliferation of chemical weapons, and Dr. Rihab Taha who specializes in the proliferation of biological weapons. The study will provide extensive information regarding the history, education, political affiliation, and writings of each individual. The hypothesis of "Weapons of mass destruction proliferants have common background traits" will be tested via a traditional research methodology.
The personality characteristics of these individuals will be analyzed in another study.
Introduction
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles that deliver them pose a major threat and must remain a major focus of U.S. defense policy and budget allocations. one of three or four most significant security threats that all of our people will face in the next whole generation, this weapons of mass destruction proliferation. We've got to stop it." 2 The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons is obviously a great concern for our President, Congress and therefore, our military. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is a particular concern for at least two reasons: 1) The large-scale and indiscriminate nature of their effects-particularly against unprotected civilians-differentiates mass destruction from conventional weapons and, 2) Unlike most categories of conventional weapons, which will likely be considered legitimate instruments of national self-defense for the foreseeable future, weapons of mass destruction engender widespread revulsion. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the ballistic missiles that carry them creates a dark cloud over the potential achievement of a stable global environment. It also raises the risks of escalation of regional conflicts.
Proliferants understand the value of these weapons for deterrence, coercion, and war; but why do they do it? Is there something in their backgrounds that caused them to think in such high-level, destructive terms? This researcher set out to find the answers to these questions.
Limitations of the Study
A research paper of this nature is limited by the amount of personal information available about each proliferant. Because of the classified nature of some of the information (especially for General Kuntsevich), this paper may appear to contain blank areas. This paper uses information regarding the significance of the work each proliferant is doing and how their work affects our national security. Information on each person's background will cover his or her current activities, history, education, political affiliations, and writings.
Proliferant Characteristics
Although difficult to categorize or "model" the backgrounds of proliferants, it will be attempted in this paper in order to help draw tangible conclusions about their backgrounds. A hypothesized set of common characteristics for purposes of this paper is that each proliferant was: 
Description of the Weapons
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are commonly lumped together under the terms "weapons of mass destruction," yet their effects, relative lethalities, and military applications are very different.
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons, which can be more than a million times more powerful than the same weight of conventional explosives, create shock waves, high pressures, flying debris, and extreme heat-the same mechanisms by which conventional explosives injure and kill, albeit on a vastly increased scale. Unlike conventional explosives, however, nuclear blasts also create neutron and gamma radiation, which can kill or harm those exposed at the instant of detonation. In addition, they generate long-term radioactivity in the form of fallout, which can spread over an area much greater than that affected by the bomb's immediate effects. In addition to producing acute illness or death at considerable distances from the destination, fallout can also lead to delayed medical problems such as cancer or genetic abnormalities which are seen as distasteful by military planners.
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Chemical Weapons
Chemical agents are poisons that incapacitate, injure, or kill through toxic effects on the skin, eyes, lungs, nerves, or other organs. Some chemical warfare agents can be lethal when vaporized and inhaled in amounts as small as a few milligrams. 
Biological Weapons
As potent as chemical agents are, however, biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsia, and viruses-can be many times deadlier, pound for pound. 6 Toxins, defined as toxic substances made by biological organisms, 7 10 Ibid.
Chapter 3 The Proliferants
The threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is global. This proliferation worries all nations who were devoted to peace and the security of their people.
-William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense 1
A Proliferant's Profile
This chapter discusses in detail three proliferants of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It provides an overview of each one's background followed by a discussion of some of their current activities and how those activities are a threat to US national security. It also provides information regarding the WMD development status of each proliferant's country.
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
Pakistan has been very aggressive in seeking out equipment, material, and technology for its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan uses China as its principle warhead materials supplier and has also sought a wide variety of nuclear related goods from many Western nations, including the United States. China has also been a supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing technology and advisory assistance.
Pakistan has made strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies. can concentrate on our education, economic and social problems." 6 Khan is a metallurgist by training, but it took a great deal more than a doctorate in metallurgy to provide Pakistan with the atomic bomb. It took a sound knowledge of atomic physics, engineering, and management. It took a degree of patriotism. It also took monumental self-absorption and egotism. Khan's efforts and dedication to make Pakistan a nuclear power was a result of his seeing the fall of East Pakistan back in 1971.
Pakistan was trapped in a political crisis and India was involved in arming the rebellions in East Pakistan to fight against the Pakistani troops. In more than 20 letters written to the network of Pakistani officials who delivered centrifuge parts from Canada during the late 1970s, Khan laid out the successes of his team. He described the travels of key operatives, the role of such companies as Siemens, Union Carbide, and others in the building of Kahuta.
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The following months and years saw more of the same. Responding to a leaked Central Intelligence Agency charge that Pakistan would be able to explode an atomic bomb within a few years, former Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq assured the world that his country had absolutely no intention of acquiring an atomic arsenal (given that the country faced no nuclear threats compared to today). Dr. Khan, however, was not so discreet. In November 1990, he said simply that Pakistan could enrich uranium and produce an atomic bomb if necessary. Dr. Khan by then had become a national hero: a scientist-manager on a par with Israel's Yuval Neeman, both western-educated. 12 He was rewarded for his patriotism by being made the head of a research institute that was named after him: the Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta.
Most of the research work done at Kahuta was attributed to the result of Dr. Khan's innovation and struggle. 13 On one occasion, after receiving a gold medal from the Pakistani Institute of National Affairs, Khan boasted that Kahuta had put Pakistan on the world nuclear map. Dr. Khan has authored many articles in his country but few are published in the western press. The reason for that is probably because of his anti-western sentiment, which comes through loud and clear in his writing. His country typically classifies his writings and the subject matter centers on ultracentrifuge technology.
Today, "The Man Of The Nation" is showered with rose petals. 20 A cricket team, the Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Eleven is named after him. Pakistan is currently issuing stamps commemorating the nuclear tests, each featuring his official portrait. Not only is he in charge of the atomic bomb program, but he is also now in charge of developing the Ghauri missile that will carry the bombs.
Dr. Khan has been compared to the madman Dr. Strangelove to which he replies: "It does not bother me what the Western press says about me. They dislike our god, they dislike our prophet, they dislike our national leaders, and no wonder they dislike anybody who tries to put this country on an independent and self-reliant path." 23 He spent 10 of those years as the head of the Center. General
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General Anatoly Kuntsevich
Kuntsevich was discharged into the reserves in 1991 as a three-star general. He is married and has two children.
Figure 2. General Anatoly Kuntsevich (Taken from Russian Television)
Why is General Anatoly Kuntsevich a concern for Western governments? Israeli intelligence analysts have expressed their concern and amazement at the rapidity and ease with which the Syrians have been able to obtain the know-how to produce VX nerve gas. According to him, however, these shipments were only intended for "research purposes"
and had been authorized by the Russian government under previously undisclosed terms of a treaty with Syria. 26 The materials shipped to Syria were intended for the production of the 38 She had earlier been responsible for tests of anthrax and botulium at Iraq's Salman Park facility.
These tests were conducted on rats, mice, rhesus monkeys, beagles and donkeys. In unreleased videotapes seized by the U.N. two years ago, the animals that had been exposed to germ agents were shown writhing and dying in agony. 39 For years, Dr. Taha has met with U.N. inspectors monitoring the most feared and least understood of Iraq's weapons programs. Under questioning, the normally mild Dr.
Taha would explode into a rage, shouting and tossing chairs. Some U.N. inspectors came to see the outbursts as a staged tactic to disrupt questioning. 
Summary of Findings
During the recent Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations, the US campaigned vigorously for the indefinite extension of a treaty to prevent a large number of nations that have no intention of developing nuclear weapons from doing so. While the NPT may have marginally slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty has not prevented nations that deem nuclear ownership to be in their interest from pursuing that ownership.
Some of the signatories-Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, for example-are engaged in intensive efforts to develop the very weapons the treaty purports to prohibit. Others who are not signatories-Pakistan and India, for example-are also pursuing nuclear weapons programs.
The relative failure of cooperative nonproliferation makes counterproliferation more important than ever. DOD's counterproliferation program follows two tracks, prevention and protection. Prevention relies on DOD's technical, military, and intelligence capabilities to help enforce arms control agreements, track technology exports, monitor ongoing nuclear programs, and intercept shipments of sensitive or illegal materials and technology. Protection includes intelligence, surveillance, ballistic missile defenses, and offensive capabilities needed if a proliferant achieves WMD capabilities. Knowledge about a proliferant's background and work histories will prove invaluable in this regard. Similarities could be found amongst the three proliferants studied in this research (see Table 1 ). The most prevalent of the attributes was the strength of each proliferant's patriotic feelings toward their country. General Kuntsevich was the one who appeared to be strongly motivated by financial incentives, although Dr. Khan certainly seemed to appreciate the benefits his country was affording him for his work. The reader has the opportunity to draw conclusions for the tabulated results. However, more data than what is available would be required in order to draw any meaningful conclusions.
Implications of the Study
The potential for the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons is widespread. Any state with nuclear reactors has the technological resources needed to produce radiological weapons or to start a nuclear weapons program. Although relatively inexpensive to produce, NBC materials are dangerous to process and store, and there are international political costs associated with violations of arms control conventions. This is true especially if the proliferant does not develop and test its weapons to U.S. standards, as is the case with Dr. Taha.
In the United States, the rationale for nuclear weapons-related programs is stated in detail and publicly debated. This is not the case in most proliferant states, whose leaders have not been willing to articulate, on the record, the factors that have prompted them to incur the costs involved in NBC proliferation (with the exception of Pakistan). 2 In some cases, self-defined security requirements appear to be the motivating factor, particularly if regional adversaries are perceived to have NBC weapons. Some of these situations have been successfully addressed through proliferation prevention policies;
other cases have not yet been amenable to such solutions.
States may try to acquire or develop NBC weapons or missiles because of a need to deter hostile neighbors that have similar capabilities. Prestige and the ability to intimidate less powerful states also could be factors. This was the case with Pakistan.
There also are situations where one of the motivations appears to be the development of NBC military capabilities as a means of offsetting the conventional superiority of the United States or other states with more capable conventional forces. Examples here would be Russia and Iraq. The result can be paradoxical, with proliferation resulting in more risks than would otherwise be the case.
Areas of Further Research
One of the core objectives in proliferation protection policy is to convince potential and actual proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value to them. The reason for that is because the United States and its coalition partners will have the capability to deny or limit the political or military utility of NBC weapons. Also, the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition forces in response will far outweigh any potential benefits of use. A useful study in this area would be to determine why this idea has not worked in the case of Iraq.
Recommendations
The Equally important will be adapting U.S. doctrine, operational concepts, training, and exercises to take full account of the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons.
Moreover, given the United States will most likely conduct future operations in coalition
